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Abstract:  
We analyze governance with a dataset on investments of venture capitalists in 3848 portfolio 
firms in 39 countries from North and South America, Europe and Asia spanning 1971-2003. 
We find that cross-country differences in Legality have a significant impact on the 
governance structure of investments in the VC industry: better laws facilitate faster deal 
screening and deal origination, a higher probability of syndication and a lower probability of 
potentially harmful co-investment, and facilitate board representation of the investor. We also 
show better laws reduce the probability that the investor requires periodic cash flows prior to 
exit, which is in conjunction with an increased probability of investment in high-tech 
companies. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Venture capital is distinct from other forms of financial intermediation primarily through the 
governance and value added that the investor provides to the investee (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).  
While the oldest and most successful venture capital market has been in the U.S., venture capital 
activities have spread across the globe with increasing vigour in the latter part of the 20
th century 
(Lerner, 2000; Lerner and Schoar, 2003).  Nevertheless, massive differences remain in the size and 
success of venture capital markets around the world.  Given the defining characteristic of venture 
capital as a form of financial intermediation is in the governance provided to their entrepreneurial 
investees, the source of international differences in venture capital markets is most likely attributable 
to the impact of laws and institutions on venture capital governance structures. 
 
In this paper, we focus on international differences in governance structures in venture capital 
in three related and equally important categories: (1) time to deal origination (which reflects screening 
and due diligence), (2) syndication and co-investment, and (3) board seats and security choice.  To 
fully understand the structure and governance of venture capitalists vis-à-vis their entrepreneurial 
investees, it is useful to examine each of these complementary and interrelated aspects in unison.  
Further, a joint analysis of each of these governance mechanisms facilitates a fairly comprehensive 
picture of the source of international differences in venture capital markets. 
 
The first main pillar of our analysis focuses on the screening process, which is of vital 
importance to venture capitalists.  For instance, venture capitalists in the U.S. receive more than 1000 
requests for financing each year, but complete at most only a couple of deals in a typical year 
(Sahlman, 1990).  In terms of cross-country differences in venture capital finance, where laws impede 
the due diligence process they slow down the rate of investment and ability of a fund to properly 
manage deal flow and the financing of meritorious entrepreneurial firms.  To the best of our 
knowledge, prior research has not investigated this particular issue in entrepreneurial finance in any 
domestic and/or international context. 
 
The screening and due diligence process is in turn closely connected to syndication and co-
investment, or the interaction among different investors within any investment.  This is the second 
main pillar of our analysis.  Prior research has established the notion that syndication enhances 
venture capitalist screening, monitoring and value-added (Lerner, 1994; Gompers and Lerner, 1999).  
By contrast, co-investment does not facilitate these governance mechanisms and may reflect an 
agency problem vis-à-vis the institutional investors if one VC fund is using capital to bail out the bad 
investments of another VC fund within the same VC organizational structure (Gompers and Lerner, 
1996, 1999).  We extend the literature in this paper by exploring the issue of whether successful legal   3
and institutional structures facilitate syndication relations and inhibit co-investment by VCs in a very 
broad international context.  
 
Our third and final pillar invokes an analysis of the interaction between venture capitalists and 
their investees.  We study cash flow and control rights that focus on the substantive aspect of 
governance as opposed to the form of governance.  In regards to the control rights, we investigate the 
question of whether the venture capitalist has a seat on the board directors of the entrepreneurial firm.  
To this end of studying control, we are able to add to prior research by studying a broader array of 
data and countries than that which has previously been possible with prior datasets.  In regards to cash 
flow rights, we believe significantly extend prior work by examining whether the financial contract 
between the VC and entrepreneur involves just upside potential for the investor, or whether or not 
there is both period cash flows provided to the investor prior to exit, as well as upside potential.  That 
is, we have specific details on the contract that get beyond the form of the contract and get more 
closely at the substantive structure of the contract.  In view of the fact that contracts of different forms 
may be functionally equivalent (Merton, 1995), and specific contractual forms that are immaterial to 
their substantive content may be attributable to hidden practice level concerns that are of first order 
importance (even in the U.S.; see Gilson and Schizer, 2003), this is an important new dimension of 
analysis that we introduce to the entrepreneurial finance literature.  Prior work (either within any 
country such as the U.S., and/or across countries) has not considered this issue in the entrepreneurial 
finance and/or venture capital literature. 
 
In each of the three main areas of our analysis we focus on the Legality index.  The Legality 
index is a weighted average of the legal index variables introduced by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), as 
defined by Berkowitz et al. (2003).  Each of the components of the Legality index is highly pertinent 
to venture finance, as discussed in detail in section 2 of this paper.  The Legality index is an 
appropriate focus of our analysis, in view of the fact that the components of the legality index are very 
highly correlated, and to focus on a subset of indices within the component of legality to avoid the 
collinearity problem might tend to have the appearance of data mining. 
 
A key component of our analysis rests with the introduction of a very large international 
dataset of 3828 venture capitalist investments from 39 countries (from North and South America, 
Europe and Asia) and 32 years (1971-2003).  Comparable papers in the literature (discussed further 
herein) have considered fewer countries and fewer transactions, and comprise different details in their 
datasets that give rise to different research questions.  We show that the legal framework has a strong 
impact on each of these closely related areas of governance, and significantly build on and extend the 
literature on international differences of venture capital.  But we also recognize limitations with the 
data and point out a number of fruitful avenues for future research toward the latter part of this paper.   4
 
The new data introduced herein reveal a number of key results with respect to international 
differences in time to investment and deal origination, syndication, co-investment, board seats, and 
the functional form of the financing instrument chosen.  Our first central result indicates that better 
laws facilitate faster deal screening and origination.  Using a convex (logarithmic) estimate to account 
for diminishing effects of an improvement in the quality of laws, we find that an increase in the 
Legality index from 20 to 21 (a typical improvement among developed nations) lowers the time until 
lead first investment by approximately 16%, whereas an increase from 10 to 11 (a typical 
improvement among emerging markets) lowers the time until lead first investment by approximately 
33%. 
 
Second, we show that better laws lead to a higher probability of syndication and a lower 
probability of potentially harmful co-investment.  In particular, an increase in Legality from 20 to 21 
increases the probability of syndication by approximately 3.0%, whereas an increase from 10 to 11 
increases the probability of syndication by approximately 5.8%.  Similarly, an increase in Legality 
from 20 to 21 reduces the probability of co-investment by approximately 1.9%, whereas an increase 
from 10 to 11 reduces the probability of co-investment by approximately 3.7%. 
 
Third, we show that better laws also facilitate board representation of the investor and reduce 
the probability that the investor requires periodic cash flows.  In particular, an increase in Legality 
from 20 to 21 increases the probability of board seats by approximately 4.3%, whereas an increase 
from 10 to 11 increases the probability of board seats by approximately 8.4%.  Similarly, an increase 
in Legality from 20 to 21 reduces the probability of periodic cash flows by approximately 1.9%, 
whereas an increase from 10 to 11 reduces the probability of periodic cash flows by approximately 
3.8%.  In regards to periodic cash flows, our data indicate a positive correspondence between Legality 
and the probability of a high-tech company (i.e., in an industry with a high market/book ratio) being 
financed (as might be expected), which at least in part accounts for the reduced probability of the use 
of securities that provide periodic cash flows.  Overall, the data indicate that Legality plays a crucial 
role in venture capitalist governance structures that facilitate the financing of high-tech 
entrepreneurial ventures, and the success of a country’s venture capital market. 
 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief overview of the literature on 
law and entrepreneurial finance.  Section 3 introduces the data and provides summary statistics.   
Econometric analyses are provided in section 4: the empirical methods used are outlined in subsection 
4.1; time to investment and deal origination is considered in subsection 4.2., syndication and co-
investment in subsection 4.3., and cash flow and control rights in subsection 4.4.  Limitations and 
future research are discussed in section 5.  The last section concludes.   5
 
2. Legality and Venture Governance 
 
The Legality index is a broad measure based on La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) which comprises 
civil versus common law systems, the efficiency of the judicial system, the rule of law, corruption, 
risk of expropriation, risk of contract repudiation, and shareholder rights (the Legality index is a 
weighted sum of the factors based on Berkowitz et al., 2003).  A higher Legality index indicates 
better substantive legal content pertaining to investing, the quality and likelihood of enforcement.  
Higher numbers indicate ‘better’ legal systems across each of the factors.  Note that Legality 
appropriately refers to the laws of the country of residence of the entrepreneurial firm.
1   
 
Our focus in this paper is on the relation between Legality and venture capital governance in 
terms of (1) time to deal origination (which reflects screening and due diligence), (2) syndication and 
co-investment, and (3) board seats and security choice.  Some of these complementary areas that we 
investigate are in part related to prior work in venture finance, but with some significant differences 
relative to that which are explicitly explored herein.  In regards to deal origination, while no direct 
work on point can be referenced, at a general level the multitude of seminal analyses in Gompers and 
Lerner (1999) on the U.S. market is consistent with the view that better laws reduce the costs of 
information flow and therefore reduce the time required to screen and originate a deal. 
 
  In regards to syndication, Lerner (1994) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) have pointed out 
significant potential problems associated with deal syndication.  In particular, where there exits a lead 
inside investor and follow-on outside investors with less information about the quality of the 
entrepreneurial firm, the lead investor may induce the follow-on investor to invest at excessively high 
deal prices, and/or finance negative NPV projects, and/or ask for a larger capital contribution than that 
which is necessary.  While Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) proposed a contractual solution to mitigate 
this problem, their model is not robust to problems of entrepreneurial moral hazard, among other 
things (as identified by Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994, as well as Bergmann and Hege, 1998; for further 
details, see Cumming, 2004).  In effect, because contracts by themselves can at best mitigate and not 
completely eliminate agency problems among syndicated investors, there is a complementary role for 
the country’s legal system in facilitating the syndication process.  Where successfully carried out, 
there is a significant role for syndication to enhance the value-added provided by the investors to the 
investees (Lerner, 1994). 
                                                 
     
1  In the vast majority of cases in our dataset the VC and entrepreneur were resident in the same country.  Of the total 
population in our data (3848 entrepreneurial firms), 266 involved a VC that was not resident in the same country.  This 
aspect of the data is not part of our group of explanatory variables, as there is no clear causal connection from choice of 
foreign/domestic investing and our dependent variables of interest in this paper.    6
 
  In contrast to syndication, co-investment is generally viewed as undesirable.  The seminal 
work on point is provided by Gompers and Lerner (1996, 1999).  Gompers and Lerner explain that 
venture fund managers have incentives to co-investment where the funds from one VC fund within a 
VC organization are used to bail out the bad investments of another fund within the same 
organization.  As such, many VC funds have covenants that prohibit such co-investment.  In terms of 
cross-country differences, we would expect the ability of institutional investors and venture fund 
managers to have an enhanced ability to write enforceable limited partnership agreements that bar co-
investment in those countries with better legal structures.  If so, co-investment itself should be 
observed less frequently in countries with better laws. 
 
  In a similar way, control rights should also naturally be related to legality.  In respect of 
control rights, we examine the representation by the VC on the entrepreneurial firm’s board of 
directors.  While this is certainly not the only dimension of control at the hands of the VC, this 
element of control tends to be highly correlated with other means by which a VC can exercise control 
(Gompers, 1997; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003), and therefore provides a useful indication as to the 
effect of Legality on control.  With our data (section 3) we are able to assess a much broader array of 
countries and time periods with a much greater volume of data than that which is considered in 
comparable studies (Kaplan et al., 2003; Lerner and Schoar, 2003), and therefore we complement the 
prior work on this specific topic (without going into the same detail in terms of different specific 
control rights). We also consider our work to be complementary to Lerner’s (1995) detailed analysis 
of board seat structure (and impact) of venture-financed firms. We expect board seats to be more 
effective in countries with higher Legality indices, because better legal systems enhance the marginal 
benefit and lower the costs to sitting on the board of directors with more transparent and complete 
access to information pertaining to the entrepreneur’s activities. 
 
  Last, but certainly not least, we examine cash flow rights in terms of the security choice.  
Research in venture capital finance has predominantly focused on the form of the security, with a 
view towards concluding that convertible preferred equity is optimal.
2  In short, this literature indicates 
convertible preferred equity securities are predominant in the United States, whereas a variety of 
instruments are used more often in other countries.
3  Again, the focus in this literature has been on the 
form of the contract, as opposed to its function in practice.  Merton (1995) (among others) has shown 
                                                 
     
2  Bascha and Walz (2001a), Berglöf (1994), Bergmann and Hege (1998), Casamatta (2003), Cornelli and Yosha, 
(2003). 
     
3  Bascha and Walz (2001b), Bergman and Hege (1998), Cumming (2004a,b), Gilson (2003), Gompers (1998), 
Gompers and Lerner (2001a,b), Hege et al. (2003), Kaplan and Strömberg (2003), Kaplan et al. (2003), Lerner and Schoar 
(2003), and Sahlman (1990).   7
that neutral mutation exists among different securities such that they may replicate one another in 
practice.  In our analysis, we focus on whether or not the security provided for period cash flows from 
the investee back to the investor (alongside the upside potential), and significantly expand the scope of 
data in the cross-country analysis (more than 3000 firms, detailed in section 3).  All else being equal, in 
countries with poor laws (in terms of investor protection, etc.), we would expect the investor to require 
periodic cash payments in addition to the possibility of an upside potential upon exit in order to mitigate 
the pronounced risks associated with investing in a countries with poor laws. 
 
  In sum, at the broadest level of generality, we conjecture that Legality (in the spirit of La 
Porta et al., 1997, 1998) matters to venture governance in the following way: better legal systems 
mitigate the risk to investment and facilitate value-added (but not ‘heavy-handed’) governance 
mechanisms.  Based on this simple broad principle, all else being equal, we therefore specifically 
predict that higher Legality indices: 
¾  (H1) reduce the costs of and time required to screen and originate a deal; 
¾  (H2) reduce the potential agency costs associated with syndication (such as lying in regards to 
deal prices among inside and outside investors, and inducing financing of negative NPV 
projects among outside investors; Lerner, 1994) and therefore facilitate the value-adding 
properties of syndication (Lerner, 1994); 
¾  (H3) increase the benefits to writing contracts vis-à-vis the institutional investors and venture 
capital fund managers which forbid co-investment, due to enhanced enforcibility, and stability 
of the legal system to sustain a long-term contract (limited partnership contracts typically 
span 10-13 years; Gompers and Lerner, 1996, 1999), thereby mitigating the probability of co-
investment; 
¾  (H4) increase the benefit to VC board representation via enhanced information flow from the 
company as mandated at law in countries with better legal systems; 
¾  (H5) reduce the need to require the entrepreneur to pay periodic cash flows to the investee 
prior to the capital gain derived upon exit (in the form of an IPO or acquisition or worse), 
such that investees that do not have the ability to pay periodic cash flows will be financed 
(i.e., riskier ventures are more likely to be financed). 
Of course, in testing these hypotheses we control for a variety of pertinent factors pertaining to market 
conditions, characteristics of the venture capitalist and characteristics of the entrepreneurial firm.   
These factors are explained below in further details in sections 3 and 4. 
 
 
 
 
   8
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
 
3.1. Data Description 
 
  Our dataset was collected by the Center of Private Equity Research (CEPRES), Germany.  
The data comprise 193 venture capital funds, 66 venture capital firms, 3848 observations for 
entrepreneurial firms, 32 years (1971 – 2003), and 39 Countries from North and South America, 
Europe and Asia.
4  The data are completely anonymous. For reasons of confidentiality, names of 
funds, firms etc. are not disclosed. 
 
The CEPRES dataset is somewhat related to other VC and entrepreneurial finance papers with 
cross-country datasets.  Gompers, Lerner and Desai (2003b) present a large dataset on entrepreneurial 
firms across different European countries, but do not consider information pertaining to venture 
capital finance.  Lerner and Schoar (2003) provide a seminal look at venture capital in emerging 
markets and present cross-country data on specific transaction structures with 167 observations, and 
focus on the form of the contract used in the developing world;
5 similarly Kaplan et al. (2003) present 
data across 107 investments in 23 countries from Europe and the North America, and focus on the 
contract used among venture capitalists in more developed countries.  Cumming and Fleming (2003) 
have data on 326 investments from 13 Asia-Pacific countries, but lack details comprised herein 
pertaining to governance, and only focus on exits.  Our dataset differs from all of these papers in that 
we consider a much larger sample of 3848 investments and focus on governance variables that are 
uniquely different relative to those considered in other studies. 
 
  Our dataset comprises a mixing of both realized (2463 firms) and unrealized (1385 firms) 
investments.  The returns to these investments (which are summarized in Cumming and Walz, 2004, 
in a study of the impact of Legality on IRRs
6 and discussed in Schmidt (2003) in a portfolio-based 
approach
7) are consistent with that reported elsewhere for U.S.-only datasets on returns (e.g., 
Cochrane, 2002).  The data are not skewed by sampling only good or bad performing investments.  
                                                 
     
4  Specifically, the countries include Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Czech, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Romania, Russia, Singapore, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the UK, and the USA. 
     
5  The number of countries and specific countries were not identified in a preliminary draft distributed at the 2003 
WFA conference, but our understanding is Lerner and Schoar (2003) were in the process of expanding their dataset. 
     
6  Cumming and Walz (2004) also study IRRs in private equity (buyouts, etc), which are not considered herein.  Our 
focus is more homogeneous on venture capital as broadly defined to encompass seed to expansion stage investments, which 
is consistent with the definition of venture capital in an international context (see, e.g., www.evca.com). 
7   In a related paper. Schmidt et al (2003) investigate the market timing ability of private equity fund managers and 
its implication on the performance of private equity funds.   9
The data span 32 years (1971 – 2003, as depicted in Figure 1).  The volume of data is consistent with 
that reported elsewhere (see, e.g., Gompers and Lerner, 1999, and Lerner, 2002a, for the volume of 
transactions in the U.S.).  The distribution of our investments over time is in line with the overall 
distribution of VC investments in entrepreneurial firms over time and can therefore be considered as a 
good intertemporal sample for the VC market.  Our data comprise the most transactions from the U.S. 
(1874 entrepreneurial firms), followed by France (395 firms), the U.K. (316 firms) and Germany (194 
firms).  The remaining 1069 entrepreneurial firms are derived from the remaining 35 countries 
identified in note 5.  The volume of data in each country roughly corresponds to the size of the 
venture capital markets in each country (comparison tests are available upon request for Europe and 
North America; however, for other less well developed regions the size of the venture capital markets 
is largely unknown or estimated with uncertain precision).  As mentioned, to provide a perspective on 
the scale and scope of data provided herein, recall that prior datasets on topic with international 
comparisons are on the order of magnitude of approximately 20 countries and a little more than 100 
entrepreneurial firms. 
 
[Figure 1 About Here] 
 
  The data comprise very detailed information on a number of different transaction-specific 
variables, as summarized and defined in Table 1.
8  The types of variables are broken down into 4 
primary categories: market and legal factors (MSCI returns, committed capital on the market, and 
legality), VC fund characteristics (fund number in the VC firm, age of fund at first investment, fund 
date, and fund capital per general partner), entrepreneurial firm characteristics (stage of development, 
industry, location), and investment characteristics (lead investor, syndication, co-investment, board 
seats, functional cash flow securities, and amounts invested).  These variables are used in the ensuing 
empirical analyses.  Numerous other variables are available in the dataset (additional details are 
available upon request); however, we focus on the ones that seemed most sensible to the research 
questions considered. 
 
[Table 1 About Here] 
 
  One of the dimensions in which we focus is the time to investment (relative to the date at 
which the fundraising was completed and the fund commenced).  Although this is not a direct 
                                                 
     
8  There are a few additional details in the dataset that are not reported in this paper.  The main reasons are that, as 
per our theoretical model, we believe we have captured the important aspects that pertain to the research questions at hand.  
Excessive reporting of other variables would detract from the central focus.   10
measure of the exact amount of time that the investors spent screening a particular deal,
9 it is 
nevertheless a useful proxy for the screening time.  While imprecise, we believe this offers an 
interesting new dimension in which we may infer the role of Legality in venture capitalist due 
diligence, among other things, and hope this inspires further data collection for future research. 
 
  In our dataset we are missing some observations for syndication, co-investment and board 
seats.  That is, for certain firms this was unknown information (but not skewed with the other aspects 
of the firms and entrepreneurs that we did know about).  The details in terms of numbers of 
observations for which we do not have specific information are directly ascertainable in Table 2.  In 
our empirics we make use of controls to account for these missing data points (as discussed below), 
and show robustness to alternative specifications (and alternative specifications not presented are 
available upon request). 
 
  One of the more significant advantages of the dataset used in this paper is that we observe the 
possibility of periodic cash flows between an entrepreneurial firm and the venture capitalist.  As such, 
we have information on the substance of the financial instruments used and the contract written 
between the VC fund and the entrepreneurial firm (i.e., the functional perspective on corporate 
finance, as described in Merton, 1995).  We use this information to construct a variable which reveals 
whether the corporate governance structure of the firm contains the possibility of some periodic cash 
flows during the life-time of the firm, which measures the functional characteristic of the financial 
instrument used.  Other papers in the venture finance literature focus on the form of the financing 
instrument as opposed to its substantive content in terms of the possible provision of periodic cash 
flows.  We believe this is an important aspect of the data in terms of understanding cross-country 
differences in venture capital contracts, because the form of the contract can be largely influenced by 
low-visibility practice level concerns in different countries (even when the substance of the contract 
can nevertheless be quite similar).
10 
 
 
 
                                                 
     
9  The exact time spent screening would require knowledge of the date at which the particular deal first came to the 
attention of the venture capitalist (and most venture capitalists we spoke with could not even provide approximations of such 
dates).  To the best of our knowledge, such private confidential data has never been obtainable for any academic VC study.  
With the vast array of data in our sample across 39 countries and 32 years, this was likewise not possible in our paper to 
obtain such specifics.  Nevertheless, we believe our details and analyses are significant new extensions to the literature. 
     
10  See, in particular, Gilson and Schizer (2003) on this point for the U.S. venture capital industry.  In the U.S. most 
contracts are structured as convertible preferred in form, but functionally only 1/3 of the contracts make use of the possibility 
of periodic cash flows back to the venture capitalist prior to exit in the U.S. (which is slightly lower than the average across 
all the 39 countries considered in our dataset).  See Table 2 for details.   11
3.2. Summary Statistics 
 
  Summary statistics are presented in Table 2.  The summary statistics are separated into 5 
primary columns: (1) time until first investment (for either lead or follow-on investment), (2) 
proportion of syndicated investments, (3) proportion of co-investments, (4) proportion of investments 
with board seats, and (5) proportion of investments with periodic cash flows.  In the first row we 
report the number of companies financed within each of these categories.  Rows 2 – 19 report 
differences in the companies financed depending on various elements in the data.  For instance, row 2 
reports the data for a large amount of capital committed on the market on the first line and a small 
amount of capital on the second line.  We report difference tests across each of the five columns for 
each of rows 2 – 19.  These tests shed light on the factors that are related to the variables in columns 
(1) – (5), as discussed further below. 
 
[Table 2 About Here] 
 
  The summary statistics in Table 2 clearly indicate conditions of Legality affect the 
dimensions of governance examined.  Regarding the Legality index (row 2 in Table 2), in countries 
with better laws the mean and median screening periods are significantly shorter (consistent with 
H1),
11 co-investment is less common (consistent with H3), and the use of periodic cash flow securities 
is less common (consistent with H5).  Although the differences in proportions for syndication and 
board seats are statistically insignificant, differences are nevertheless revealed in multivariate contexts 
in section 4. 
 
  The data and summary comparison tests further indicate market conditions give rise to 
significant differences in regards to the governance variables.  In periods of strong market conditions 
(high MSCI returns; row 3 in Table 2), which reflects a competitive situation for venture capital 
investments (Gompers and Lerner, 2000), our data indicate average screening duration is shorter, 
syndication and co-investment are less common, board seats are less common, and the use of 
securities that provide periodic cash flows is more common.  Similarly, with a high volume of 
committed capital in the VC industry (row 4 in Table 2) we find significantly lower median screening 
periods, more frequent syndication and co-investment, as well as more frequent use of board seats and 
                                                 
     
11  Our summary statistics are presented for the time to first investment for all lead and follow-on investors.  Our 
multivariate analyses (section 4) focus on the time until lead investment (deal origination).  Summary statistics for time until 
deal origination yielded similar qualitative conclusions and are available upon request from the authors.  As well, note that 
row 14 in Table 2 provides a comparison of time to lead investment versus time to non-lead investment (and as would be 
expected, time to lead investment is longer because deal origination requires more intensive due diligence; this is consistent 
with Lerner’s 1994 analysis of syndication among U.S. funds).   12
less frequent investment with periodic cash flows.  This is quite intuitive: if the competitive situation 
stemming from returns in other asset classes is less pronounced and a large volume of capital inflows 
into the VC industry can be observed, then ‘money chasing deals’ in the VC industry (Gompers and 
Lerner, 2000) lead to less intensive screening, less syndication as well as to less direct financial 
controls via investments with periodic cash flows.  As well, co-investment is less common in strong 
market conditions as the incentive to co-invest is strongest when one venture fund is needed to bail 
out the bad investments of a companion fund within the same VC organization (Gompers and Lerner, 
1996, 1999).  Overall, our data are strongly supportive of Gompers and Lerner’s seminal work. 
 
  The data indicate a relation between fund specific characteristics and governance (see rows 5, 
6, 7, and 8 in Table 2).  Rows 5 and 6 indicate that older venture capitalists spend less time screening 
their deals.  Obviously experience facilitates due diligence and screening. Moreover, venture firms 
with long lasting working experience in that industry mostly developed a broad experts network 
which facilitates the due diligence process. Likewise, the length of the time period until investment 
hinges on the availability of resources of the fund per general partner.  The more capital per fund 
manager (row 8) the shorter the due diligence and screening process becomes on average, which is 
quite intuitive as more resources per manager constrain the time available in the screening process 
thereby shortening the typical period towards deal origination.  
 
There is a pronounced difference of the impact of the VC’s age (row 5 in Table 2) on 
syndication and co-investment: whereas older VC organizations seem to syndicate less, they co-invest 
more.  This is somewhat indirectly at odds with the reputational character of (older) VCs (as reported 
in the seminal work of Lerner, 1994), but the comparison statistics in terms of the age of the VC 
organization in our data most likely pick up the positive correlation between the age of the VC 
organization and the fund number (as confirmed in our multivariate analyses reported in the 
subsequent sections).  Table 2 also indicates that older VC organizations tend to rely more on direct 
control mechanisms (board seats) rather than indirect control mechanisms (financial instruments with 
periodic cash flows); we comment further on this aspect of the data in the next section. 
 
  Finally, there is a relation between entrepreneur deal specific characteristics and governance 
(see rows 9-19).  Most notably, our findings indicate that the time to duration is significantly shorter 
the less money is at stake (rows 9-15).  In particular, our comparison tests suggest that small, early 
stage investments taking place in fast-growing industries (high market-to-book ratio) and in which a 
non-lead investment is undertaken take a shorter due diligence and contracting period.  While the 
comparison tests indicate rather little influence of firm characteristic on the proportion of co-invested 
deals, we observe that syndication is more likely to occur for seed, start-up and early stage   13
investments and high market-to-book firms indicating some evidence of risk-sharing as syndication 
motive.  
 
  Overall, the data indicate a strong relation between governance and the legal and economic 
framework faced by the entrepreneurial firms and venture capital funds.  These univariate tests 
provide a first glance at the data.  Since our univariate analysis indicates a multitude of factors that 
appear to drive the different dimensions of venture governance, it is important to provide more formal 
multivariate analyses.  These multivariate tests are provided in the next section. 
 
4. Multivariate Empirical Analyses 
 
  In this section we first describe the empirical methods in subsection 4.1.  Thereafter, we 
present an analysis of time to deal origination (subsection 4.2), staging and syndication (subsection 
4.3) and board seats and functional cash flow securities (subsection 4.4).  Limitations, alternative 
explanations and suggestions for future research are discussed in section 5. 
 
4.1. Empirical Methods 
 
In our multivariate analysis we address three different areas with different empirical methods.  
In the first part (Table 4) we analyse the time from venture capital fund origination to deal origination 
(the first lead investment in the entrepreneurial firm).  The dependent variable is the time between 
fundraising and the day of lead first investment by the venture capitalist for the particular 
entrepreneurial firm.  Thereby, we make use one of the most widely used duration model, the Cox 
proportional hazard model (which is also used in, for example, Gompers’ 1995 analysis of venture 
capitalist staging decisions).  This particular type of a duration model is particularly helpful when the 
exact time of each ‘exit’
12 is known, a property which is fulfilled in our data set.  
 
The proportional hazard model describes the (instantaneous) hazard function h(t) as a vector 
of explanatory variables x with unknown variables and ho as the baseline hazard rate: h(t)=ho 
exp(x’ß).  In our context, the hazard rate depicts for every particular entrepreneurial firm the 
probability of receiving the first lead investment.  Because our data are derived from the venture 
capitalists themselves, we do not observe the time to lead venture capitalist investment for all 
entrepreneurial firms in our sample; as such, suitable adjustments to the hazard functions were made 
(using Greene, 1998) to account for the unobserved time until the receipt of lead venture capitalist 
financing.  More precisely, the instantaneous hazard rate h(t) is just the probability of receiving funds 
                                                 
     
12  Although ‘exit’ is the language in the econometric literature on duration, this ‘exit’ actually means ‘first 
investment’ in our analysis of time until investment.   14
in a (short) time spell (between t and t+dt) given that it has not received money up to t.  The Cox 
proportional hazard model can used to estimate ß without specifying the form of the baseline hazard 
function ho (see Kiefer, 1988, p. 667).  As such, the hazard rates (exp(x’ß)) are easily computable 
from the reported coefficients, which measures the economic significance of the coefficient estimates.  
Table 4 presents, for given values of the independent variables, the probability of receiving the first 
investment.  Hence, the coefficients are readily interpretable.  A positive coefficient implies a higher 
probability of receiving investments implying that the first investment takes place faster; conversely, a 
longer period towards the first investment is indicated by a negative coefficient.   
 
  Parts two and three of our regression analysis (Tables 5 and 6, respectively) are based on logit 
regressions. We investigate factors which determine whether investment deals are syndicated or in 
which co-investment took place (Table 5), as well as the determinants of board seats and the use of 
securities with periodic cash flows (Table 6).  Rather than dropping the observations for which we do 
not have information on syndication, co-investment and board seats (discussed in section 3 and 
indicated in Table 2), we included these investments by using multinomial logit regressions.  More 
precisely we assigned a zero value if no syndication took place and a two if syndication was reported.  
If we had no information on syndication a value of one was assigned.  The same classification 
procedure was used for co-investment and board seats.  Our results are extremely similar to results 
that simply exclude observations in which we have incomplete information on these variables and use 
binomial logits.
13  We present the marginal effects (to explicitly show economic significance in the 
tables) as opposed to the actual logit coefficients.  The marginal effects are explicitly presented for the 
probability of observing outcome 0 (no syndication or no co-investment as the case may be), and for 
observing outcome 2 (syndication or co-investment, depending on the model in the table).
14  Since we 
do not have any observation where the realization of our periodic cash flow variable was unknown, 
we employ a conventional binomial logit model in that case (Models 6-10 in Table 6).  We present 
different models with different right-hand-side variables to show robustness to potential collinearity. 
 
In each of our multivariate analyses we include explanatory variables to account for market 
and legal factors (the MSCI return and committed capital in the market at the first investment date, 
and the Legality index in which the firm, each defined in Table 1) to proxy for the market and legal 
settings in which the VCs operate.  Our central variable of focus – the Legality index – was explained 
                                                 
     
13  Such results are not explicitly reported but are nevertheless available upon request.  Likewise, numerous other 
robustness checks (e.g., other variables, other econometric methods with sample selection corrections, etc) were considered 
but did not materially affect the results.  Additional specifications are available upon request. 
     
14  In Table 6 we only present the marginal effects for the outcome 2 in the case of board seats, as the marginal effects 
for the 0 outcome indicate no differences and provide no additional insights.   15
in detail in section 2.  With the market variables we want to approximate the interaction of supply and 
demand in the VC market and its consequence on governance structures.  
 
Furthermore, our explanatory variables control for VC fund characteristics, as well as 
entrepreneurial firm and investment characteristics.  In terms of VC fund characteristics, in our 
analysis of time until first investment (Table 4) we include controls for the fund number within the 
fund organization, the fund capital per general partner, and a time trend which accounts for the date at 
which the fund was set up (this latter variable is used in Ljungqvist and Richardson, 2003, in their 
analysis of the returns to U.S. private equity investment; we have included this variable with the same 
square root transformation that they employ).  These variables are proxies for the experience of the 
fund managers and ability to carry out due diligence prior to lead investment.  Our analyses of 
syndication and co-investment (Table 5) and board seats and functional cash flow securities (Table 6) 
use the date until first investment (whether lead or otherwise) and the fund number within the VC 
firm.  In Tables 5 and 6, unlike Table 4, we dropped the variables for capital under management per 
fund manager, primarily due to collinearity with the unknown outcomes for the dependent variables; 
that is, for 892 of the firms financed we do not know the capital under management per general 
partner and therefore the loss of these observations creates problems in multivariate estimation of 
these three dependent variables (syndication, co-investment and board seats) when capital under 
management is included as an explanatory variable.  In terms of entrepreneur and deal specific 
characteristics, we include dummy variable controls for the stage of entrepreneurial firm development 
at first investment (a dummy variable for an unknown venture capital stage is suppressed), the 
industry market/book ratio, industry dummy variables, investment year dummies, country dummies, 
and a variable for the size of the first investment (again, the precise definitions of all of these variables 
is provided in Table 1).  For the analyses for syndication, co-investment, board seats, and periodic 
cash flow securities (Table 5 and 6) we include a dummy variable equal to 1 for the lead investor; that 
variable is not included for the analysis of time until lead investment (i.e., deal origination; Table 4) 
for obvious reasons.  Gompers and Lerner (1999) generally use very similar variables to proxy for 
investment risk and growth options in their seminal analyses of venture finance in the U.S. 
 
One could potentially argue that one of our variables – the amount invested – is potentially 
endogenous to the time until first investment (although the entrepreneur’s capital requirements could 
be viewed as exogenous).  We did consider this issue, but were limited by the absence of ideal 
instruments; potential instruments were closely connected to the time until first lead investment as 
well.  Because an elimination of the amount invested does not materially change the overall reported 
results, and because various instruments considered did not materially affect the results, we consider 
this endogeneity issue to be of minor importance and report the standard results with this variable.  
   16
  Finally, note that with the exception of our dummy variable, the other variables measured in 
levels are expressed in logs to account for declining marginal impacts of higher levels of these 
variables on the dependent variables of interest (the one exception is the transformation to the time 
trend date variable with was transformed with a square root, following Ljungqvist and Richardson, 
2003, and discussed above).  For instance, an increase in the Legality index from 10 to 11 is expected 
to have a more pronounced effect on governance than an increase from 20 to 21.  We did estimate the 
models without the use of logs, but found the qualitative conclusions pertaining to statistical 
significance to be quite similar and hence do not report those results.  Model diagnostic tests generally 
supported the models in logs, and therefore we only present those results. 
 
4.2. Analysis of Time to Deal Origination 
 
The estimation results of the Cox proportional hazard model are displayed in Table 4.  We 
distinguish between two types of regressions. In the first part of Table 4 (Models 1-5) the dependent 
variable measures the time until lead investment for all stages (seed, start-up, early and expansion 
stage).  In the second part of Table 4 (Models 6-10) the dependent variable measures the time until 
lead investment in seed, start-up and early stage investments (only).  In the second part (Models 6-10) 
we exclude the expansion stage investments
15 and use them as reference group for our estimation.  
The second part is provided to check the robustness of the estimated economic and statistical 
significance.  In each part we estimate different models to check robustness.  The main results from 
our comparison tests (Table 2) carry over to the multivariate analysis.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
  Our results on the effects of the legal system are in line with our theoretical reasoning: better 
laws facilitate the screening and due-diligence process and hence lead to faster deal origination (see 
H1).  In terms of the economic significance, the estimated effects in Models 1–5 indicate quite large 
hazard ratios for the log of the Legality index.  In particular, an increase in Legality from 20 to 21 (an 
improvement among developed nations) increases the probability of ‘exit’ (lead investment) by 
approximately 16%, whereas an increase from 10 to 11 (an improvement among emerging markets) 
increases the probability of ‘exit’ (lead investment) by 33% in any given time interval (i.e., shortens 
time to lead investment).
16  For Models 6–10 in Table 4, the estimated economic significance on 
                                                 
     
15  We also exclude in this second part the entrepreneurial firms for which we do not know the stage of development 
at the time of first investment. 
     
16  Using the estimates in Model 1 in Table 4, the calculation is e
2.998*(ln(21)-ln(20))-100%, and in the second case is 
e
2.998*(ln(11)-ln(10))-100%.  The Legality index values range from 8.51 (for the Philippines) to 21.91 (for Switzerland) in our 
dataset (the complete list of countries is provided in note 4).   17
Legality is about half as large, which indicates that the impact of Legality on time to deal origination 
is less pronounced (but nevertheless still quite large and ranging from 8 – 16% change for a 1-point 
change in the Legality index) for seed, start-up and early stage firms.  This has strong implications for 
the development of the venture capital market and the access of entrepreneurial firms to risk capital.  
Overall, this provides very strong evidence in support of our first central hypothesis (H1) that Legality 
facilitates information flows, shortens screening time and time to contracting.  Through this 
mechanism, Legality therefore has strong implications for the development of venture capital markets 
and the access of entrepreneurial firms to risk capital.   
 
A number of our other variables are significant in ways that we would expect.  For instance, 
at a general level, the data support the idea that market conditions affect the selection and due 
diligence process (see Inderst and Müller, 2003, and Gompers and Lerner, 2000).  The data fairly 
consistently indicate across each of the models that an increase in MSCI returns in the year of 
investment by 10% speeds up the due diligence process by approximately 3.8% (using similar 
computations as in note 16). This effect can also be interpreted as a sign of overconfident market 
players in times of positively performing capital markets. There is also some evidence that committed 
capital on the market is a significant factor, but the effect of this variable is sensitive to the 
inclusion/exclusion of the other variables.  In particular, one of the variables – fund capital/general 
partner – significantly reduces the number of observations (because we do not have data for this 
variable for 892 cases), which affects the significance committed capital variable and the fund number 
variable.  The data do suggest (at least for Models 6–9) that an increase in fund capital / general 
partner speeds up the time to lead investment.  This is consistent with the view that screening time is 
reduced by specific skills of (experienced) venture capitalists with their ability and willingness to 
screen potential investments by using their network (see, e.g., Gompers, 1995, and Hellman and Puri, 
2002).  (But another interpretation of this variable might simply be that funds with significant capital 
might need to invest such capital quicker; consistent with Jensen, 1986; Gompers and Lerner, 2000).  
Furthermore, our results reveal a time trend.  In the absence of the investment-year dummy variables 
the time-trend variable (fund date) is significant, indicating that for funds established in the recent 
past the time to deal origination is longer. 
 
Finally, a number of results pertaining to the investment stage and investment characteristics 
are significant.  The data indicate the time to deal origination is quicker for seed and start-up firms, as 
well as firms with smaller capital requirements.  These results are very robust and indicate VCs view 
the costs of a mistake (financing a firm that should not have been financed) as being comparatively 
smaller for smaller investments.  As well, one might view this evidence as being consistent with the 
fact that seed and start-up firms simply have little or no track record, and therefore the degree of due 
diligence that could be carried out prior to investment is less extensive.  The data also consistently   18
indicate that lead investments in firms operating in industries with high market-to-book ratios are 
undertaken faster.  This latter result is perhaps somewhat surprising if we were to view the need due 
diligence to be greater among high-tech firms in risky industries.  A plausible explanation is that 
venture capitalists have a tendency to invest in potentially more profitable high-tech companies early 
on in their cycle in order to facilitate future fundraising efforts when (and if) such investments come 
to fruition (cf. Gompers, 1996; Gompers and Lerner, 1999, 2000; Lerner and Schoar, 2002). 
 
4.3. Analysis of Syndication and Co-Investment 
 
  Whereas we asked in the previous subsection about how long it takes until a deal it originated 
by the lead-investor, we now analyze the question of with whom the investor undertakes the 
investment or whether he stays on his own.  We once again display various empirical models which 
provide insights on the robustness of our results (see Table 5).  Recall (as discussed in subsection 3.1.) 
that we present in Table 5 the probability of no syndication (and no co-investment) and the probability 
of syndication (and co-investment) separately in Table 5 because we make use of multinomial logit 
models (where the 3
rd possible outcome is an unknown syndication or co-investment).  The results 
from this procedure are very robust to alternative specifications for the unknown data, as discussed. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
The effect of the legal system on the likelihood of syndication and co-investment to occur is 
quite robust and provides strong support for our theoretical reasoning.  Consistent with H2, the data 
indicate better laws mitigate potential agency problems associated with syndication and enhance the 
potential for the value-added effect of syndication (consistent with Lerner, 1994), thereby leading to a 
higher probability of syndication.  In particular, an increase in Legality from 20 to 21 (an 
improvement among developed markets) increases the probability of syndication by approximately 
3.0%, whereas an increase from 10 to 11 (an improvement among emerging markets) increases the 
probability of syndication by approximately 5.8%.
17 
 
The legal system has the opposite effect on the probability of co-investment relative to 
syndication.  The data indicate that the more developed the rights in regards to investor protection and 
enforcement (i.e., the higher the Legality index) the less likely is it that co-investment is observed 
(consistent with H3). This effect is robust and significant in all specifications. In particular, an 
                                                 
     
17  Using the estimates in Model 2 in Table 5, the calculation is 0.609*(ln(21)-ln(20)) in the first case, and is 
0.609*(ln(11)-ln(10)) in the second case.  The inclusion of the time date trend variable in Model 3 significantly lowers the 
economic significance of these estimates (although they are still statistically significant), partly as a result of collinearity 
introduced into the system with the inclusion of this extra variable.   19
increase in Legality from 20 to 21 reduces the probability of co-investment by approximately 1.9%, 
whereas an increase from 10 to 11 reduces the probability of co-investment by approximately 3.7%. 
Since syndication is typically regarded as a positive mechanism
18 whereas co-investment is regarded 
as a problematic device this once again stresses the efficiency-enhancement associated with better 
legal systems.   
 
A number of our other variables are significant and consistent with single-country studies on 
syndication (although co-investment has been less frequently studied).  The inflow of capital in the 
VC industry has a positive effect on the likelihood of both syndication and co-investments.  In regards 
to syndication, the data supports Zacharikis (2002) (and see Lerner, 1994, for seminal work) in that 
syndication can be considered to be a mechanism to create a larger network (of venture capitalist) and 
hence serve the purpose of ensuring a steady deal flow in the future.  The more capital is chasing a 
given number of entrepreneurial firms, the more it makes sense to syndicate in order to ensure future 
deals.  In regards to co-investment, the data are suggestive that one venture capital fund has resources 
to spread to another fund in the same organization when there is more capital on the market.  The 
impact of the committed capital variable is, however, much smaller on co-investments than on 
syndication.  
 
Our findings also support the idea that syndication facilitates information-sharing (see e.g., 
Sah and Stiglitz, 1986, Lerner, 1994, and Casamatta and Haritchabalet, 2003).  Especially younger 
funds and funds at the beginning of their life-time show a higher likelihood to syndicate.  For these 
venture capital funds the gains of syndication via information sharing is largest.  Similarly, the date 
time trend in Model 3 indicates funds established in the recent past are more likely to syndicate 
(whereas the time trend variable is insignificant in regards to the probability of co-investment). 
 
We find that seed- and early-stage investments are significantly more likely to be financed via 
syndicated deals compared to expansion-stage investments. This confirms the view that syndication is 
especially valuable since it leads to risk-diversification (see Lerner, 1994, and Chowdhry and Nanda, 
1996).  The fact that our data indicate the likelihood of syndication increases with the industry 
market-to-book ratio, indicating that syndication takes place especially in industries with few tangible 
assets, is consistent with this view. 
 
The effects of the entrepreneurial and investment characteristics on co-investment are not 
clear-cut.  There is some evidence (Model 4) that co-investment is more likely for expansion stage 
firms, which is fairly intuitive as firms in this stage may require excess capital and may have yet to 
                                                 
     
18  See, however, Kaplan/Strömberg (2003a) who disagree with this view and argue that entrepreneurial firms which 
are financed by a single VC receive superior management support.   20
show profits (i.e., this might reflect agency problems associated with co-investment; see Gompers and 
Lerner, 1996, 1999).  Similarly, Models 5 and 6 suggest that co-investment is more likely among 
riskier high market/book industries.  However, these results are somewhat sensitive to the model 
specification.  Overall, the strongest and most significant results pertaining to syndication and co-
investment are in regards to the Legality index (discussed above, and consistent with Gompers and 
Lerner, 1996, 1999). 
 
4.4. Analysis of Control and Cash Flow Rights 
 
In this final step of our multivariate analyses we address core aspects of the chosen corporate 
governance structure in the relationship between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneurial firm. 
Thereby, we consider two aspects, one addressing a formal control mechanism (board seats; Models 
1-5 in Table 6) and the second one looking into a functional control and cash flow device (namely the 
existence of financial instruments which lead to periodic cash flows paid by the firm to the venture 
capitalists; Models 6-10 in Table 6).  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
The data indicate a significant impact of the Legality index on board seat representation, 
providing strong empirical support for H4 (section 2).  In particular, an increase in Legality from 20 to 
21 increases the probability of board seats by approximately 4.3%, whereas an increase from 10 to 11 
increases the probability of board seats by approximately 8.4%.  The data are thus consistent with the 
view that better laws significantly increase the benefit to VC board representation by ensuring 
enhanced information flows from management to board seat members.   
 
  We also find evidence in support of H5 that better laws are associated with a significant 
reduction in the probability in the use of securities that provide periodic cash flows (Model 6 in Table 
6).  In particular, an increase in Legality from 20 to 21 (an improvement among developed markets) 
reduces the probability of periodic cash flows by approximately 1.9%, whereas an increase from 10 to 
11 (an improvement among emerging markets) reduces the probability of periodic cash flows by 
approximately 3.8%.  However, it is important to point out that the statistical significance of this 
effect is not robust to the inclusion of the industry market/book variable.  Referring back to Table 3, 
we see that firms in high market/book industries are much more likely to be funded in countries that 
have higher legality indices (which is an expected result for each of the reasons indicated in section 2; 
higher market/book industries are generally riskier, and legality mitigates this risk).  High-tech firms 
in high market/book industries are less likely to be financed with securities that provide periodic cash 
flows (Models 7 – 10 in Table 6) (again, this is expected because such firms typically have greater   21
operating risk and less stable cash flows to facilitate such periodic cash payments).  Taken together, 
the evidence indicates Legality facilitates the financing of risky high-tech companies in high 
market/book industries without the need for periodic cash flows paid back to the venture investor 
prior to exit. 
 
Numerous other control variables are significant, and in ways that are quite intuitive.  For 
instance, the data indicate that the supply of risk capital, as approximated by the committed capital to 
the industry variable, affects governance structures in the VC industry for both board seats and 
periodic cash flows (consistent with Inderst and Müller, 2003).  A greater supply of capital increases 
the likelihood that the VC is on the board of directors, and reduces the probability that the VC 
requires periodic cash flows.  These results likely reflect a comparative need to offer more advice to 
the entrepreneur (via board representation) and demand less from the entrepreneur (via periodic cash 
flows) when there is greater competition among the VCs.  
 
The data consistently indicate that venture capitalists that have spent more time screening 
their investments are less inclined to sit on the board of directors (i.e., less control is needed when due 
diligence has been more thorough).  Screening time, however, is unrelated to the use of securities with 
periodic cash flows.  Venture capital funds that have previously operated a greater number of funds 
are less likely to sit on the board of directors and less likely to require periodic cash flows.  All of 
these results are consistent in that funds part of an older VC organization may view their skills at 
attracting and picking winners to be superior (which is consistent with the analysis of venture capital 
reputation in the U.S. that is provided by Hsu, 2003).  Similarly, the date time trend variable indicates 
that funds established in the recent past are more likely to take board seats and more likely to require 
periodic cash flows.  Periodic cash flows are more likely to be required among funds with less capital 
under management (funds raised) per general partner. 
 
The data do indicate support for the view that higher MSCI market returns increase the 
probability that securities with periodic cash flows will be used.  This is expected, as better market 
conditions increase the likelihood that the entrepreneurial firm can take on such a security and 
actually meet the payment obligations.  Competitive pressures from the capital markets (high MSCI 
return) may also induce VCs to use periodic cash flow instruments as an indirect functional control 
device (although the MSCI market returns in the year of investment are unrelated to the likelihood of 
board seat representation). 
 
The findings with respect entrepreneurial firm characteristics are in line with theory: 
investments in the early stages (seed, start-up and early stage investments) as well as firms with a high 
growth potential (high industry market-to-book ratios) are less capable to pay periodically cash to the   22
investor. Hence, for those firms, periodic cash flow instruments are an expensive control device and 
hence, can be expected to be less in use.  This is confirmed by our empirical results as displayed in 
Table 6.  Similarly, earlier stage firms and firms in high market/book industries tend to be more likely 
to have VCs on the board of directors (all the results in Table 6 are supportive, with the exception of 
the start-up stage variable in the board seat regressions).  This is generally consistent with the seminal 
work of Gompers and Lerner (1999) on the U.S. VC market, where earlier stage and high 
market/book firms exhibit greater potential agency problems and require more monitoring. 
 
In all our models the investment characteristics have significant effects on the likelihood of 
VC board seat representation and the use periodic cash flow instruments.  Larger initial investments 
are associated with a smaller probability that the VC is on the board of directors (consistent with the 
stage results discussed immediately above), and a greater probability that periodic cash flow securities 
are used (consistent with the view that these securities are more likely observed when the larger 
investee has the ability to make such periodic payments).  The data also indicate that lead investors 
are more likely to sit on the board of directors (consistent with Gompers and Lerner, 1999).  Lead 
investors are also more likely to hold securities that provide periodic cash flows, which likely reflects 
in part the importance of providing another control mechanism to the lead investor, and in part the 
importance of compensation for the extra risk undertaken by the lead investors.  Conversely, non-lead 
investors are not in the position to control the entrepreneurial firm thereby lacking the necessity to 
employ the periodic cash flow instrument. 
 
Overall, we may infer from the data and empirical tests in this section that in addition to VC 
fund and entrepreneurial firm characteristics, the legal system affects both venture governance 
structures and venture investment patterns, thereby playing a vital role in the development of venture 
capital industries around the world. 
 
5. Limitations and Future Research 
 
Our data and empirical analyses afford a significant improvement in the understanding of the 
impact of the legal and economic framework on the investment patterns and the governance structures 
in the venture capital industry around the globe.  Given the importance of the venture capital industry 
to long-run innovation and economic growth (Gompers and Lerner, 1999, 2001; Kortum and Lerner, 
2000; Lerner, 2002a,b; Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2001; Keuschnigg, 2002; Keuschnigg and 
Nielsen, 2001, 2003a,b,c, 2004), an understanding of the sources of differences in venture capital 
markets and governance is of vital importance to academics and practitioners alike.  Although our 
data significantly add to the depth and breadth relative to others in existence, there are of course 
limitations to the data and therefore potentially fruitful routes towards future research.   23
 
For reasons of conciseness and empirical focus, and in part data limitations, our analysis 
concentrated on only 5 related aspects of governance (screening, syndication, co-investment, board 
seats, and the functional form of the financial instrument).  Thereby, the analysis does not analyse the 
potential interplay with further aspects of the governance structure (most notably investment staging, 
potential CEO replacement, and other covenants).  While we consider this being somewhat of a 
limitation of our paper we think that nevertheless we were able to shed important light on the 
particular issues covered, especially by using our very international data set.  While a broader 
treatment of the governance issue would add to completeness in some respects it would have resulted 
in comparatively less focus and without altering the conclusions drawn from the analyses provided. 
 
In our empirical analysis we used a broad index for the legal system recently developed in the 
corporate finance literature (Berkowitz et al., 2003; as based on La Porta et al., 1997, 1998).  Each of 
the components of the Legality index is highly pertinent to venture finance.  We do not focus on 
specific components of this index because they are highly correlated, and to focus on a subset of the 
components would result in an exercise tantamount to data mining.  We considered other indices, but 
did not find material differences in the results relative to those reported herein. 
 
  One limitation of our data is that we do not have information pertaining to other financial 
intermediaries that may have been involved in the financing of the company (such as banks and angel 
investors).  This is a common limitation of almost all datasets in venture capital and private equity 
research.  We do not have reason to believe that this limitation affects our main results in any 
systematic way.  For instance, the time to deal origination is based on the time to investment in deals 
prior to the presence of other financial intermediaries.  Nevertheless, future research (either with 
country-specific datasets and/or international datasets) could more fully investigate this issue. 
 
There are other various possibilities of future research emerging directly from our approach.  
The main focus of our analysis was to investigate the determinants of the governance structure of VC-
financed entrepreneurial firm. Clearly it would be very interesting to closer investigate the 
implications of the corporate governance especially on divestment choices (including the holding 
period, exit timing and choice of exit channels).  Thereby, some recent theoretical approaches (see 
Aghion et al., 2002; Neus and Walz, 2004; Schwienbacher, 2002) in this field could be empirically 
tested.  Furthermore, a second set of implications of the governance structure namely on the success 
of the venture firm as well as of the venture fund could be investigated. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
The empirical evidence presented in this paper sheds new light on the structure of the VC 
market and the governance structure of the VC-financed entrepreneurial firms in a number of aspects. 
Using a very broad and international data set which also provides information on the cash flows 
between entrepreneurial firms and the venture capital fund we investigated the factors determining the 
investment pattern and the governance patterns between the entrepreneurial firm and the venture 
capitalists.  Thereby, we were especially focusing on the influence of the legal framework in the 
different countries firms and VCs operate.  Our data sample of 3848 entrepreneurial firms not only 
comprises a large number of different countries (39) but also a fairly large time span (1971-2003).  
Given the distribution of the portfolio firms across countries and time our sample can be considered to 
be a good representation of the overall development of the international VC market and a significant 
step for the purpose of studying the interplay between legality and venture governance. 
 
  The very broad international dataset introduced herein indicates the legal system has a strong 
impact on the various aspects of the VCs investment pattern and the venture governance.  In 
particular, the data indicate that better laws facilitate the deal origination process, increase the 
probability of syndication and mitigate the probability of (potentially damaging) co-investment.   
Board representation of VCs is also significantly more pronounced in countries with more developed 
legal systems.  Further, we find some evidence that superior legal systems mitigate the need to use 
securities that provide periodic cash flows.  In that latter respect, however, we also showed that this is 
significantly attributable to the fact that firms in high-tech industries are significantly more likely to 
be financed in countries with better legal systems, and such high-tech firms tend to not be financed 
with the use of securities that provide periodic cash flows back to the investor. 
 
These results provide a core understanding of the mechanisms that give rise to international 
differences in the size of venture capital markets.  Governance is a defining attribute of venture capital 
as a form of financial intermediation (Gompers and Lerner, 1999, 2001).  Better legal systems have 
sound implications on the assertiveness of important mechanisms for solving agency and control 
problems inherent in the financing of young, innovative firms.  Thereby, a sound legal framework can 
be regarded as an important pre-requisite for the development of sustained venture capital 
development in a country. 
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 Table 1.  Definition of Variables 
This table defines the variables considered in this paper.  Summary statistics are presented in Tables 2 and 3. 
Variable  Description 
     
Dependent Variables   
Time to Investment  The time from the start of the fund (end of the fundraising period) to the lead investment in the particular company. 
Syndication  A variable equal to one if the investment was syndicated, and 0 if not syndicated.  For observations in which syndication was unknown, this variable is assigned 
the value 2 in the multivariate multinomial logit regressions. 
Co-Investment  A variable equal to one if the investment was a co-invested, and 0 if not co-invested.  For observations in which co-investment was unknown, this variable is 
assigned the value 2 in the multivariate multinomial logit regressions. 
Board Seats  A variable equal to one if the investment involved board seats, and 0 if not board seats.  For observations in which board seats were unknown, this variable is 
assigned the value 2 in the multivariate multinomial logit regressions. 
Periodic Cash Flows  A variable equal to one if the investment functionally allowed for periodic cash flows paid back to the investor prior to exit, in addition to the upside potential of the 
capital gain for the investor upon exit. 
   
Market and Legal Factors    
MSCI Return  The country-specific MSCI return in the year of investment. 
Committed Capital in Market at 
Investment Date 
The industry total committed venture capital in the overall U.S. market (as reported by Venture Economics) in the year of investment.  This variable is a proxy for 
deal flow competition.  The measure is from the U.S. and not specific countries in the data to avoid correlation with the Legality index. 
Legality Index  Weighted average of following factors (based on Berkowitz et al. (2003)): civil versus common law systems, efficiency of judicial system, rule of law, corruption, 
risk of expropriation, risk of contract repudiation, shareholder rights. Higher numbers indicate 'better' legal systems. 
     
VC Fund Characteristics    
Fund Number in the VC Firm  The number of VC funds the VC firm had operated prior to this current fund. 
Fund Age at First Investment  The age (in days) of the VC fund from the date of fundraising to the date of the first investment round in the particular entrepreneurial firm financed. 
Portfolio Size (# Investees) / # 
General Partners  The number of investee companies in the VC fund / the number of general partners in the fund. 
Fund Date (Time Trend)  The date at which the fund was raised (in days, scaled such that January 1 1971 is equal to 1). 
Fund Capital / General Partner  The capital raised by the fund (in real 2003 US dollars) divided by the number of general partners. 
     
Entrepreneurial Firm 
Characteristics    
Seed Stage  A dummy variable equal to 1 for financing provided to research, assess and develop an initial concept before a business has reached the start-up phase. 
Start-up Stage  A dummy variable equal to 1 for financing provided to companies for product development and initial marketing. Companies may be in the process of being set up 
or may have been in business for a short time, but have not sold their product commercially. 
Early Stage  A dummy variable equal to 1 for financing provided to companies with product in testing and/or pilot production.  The company may or may not be generating 
revenue, and has usually been in business less than 30 months. 
Expansion Stage 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for financing provided to companies in need of development capital.   The financing is provided for the growth and expansion of a 
company, which may or may not break even or trade profitably. Capital may be used to: finance increased production capacity; market or product development; 
provide additional working capital. 
Industry Market / Book  The industry market/book ratio for the company's primary industry. 
Industry Dummy Variables  Dummy variables equal to 1 for the company's primary industry. 
Country Dummy Variables  Dummy variables equal to 1 for the company's country of primary residence. 
Investment Year Dummy 
Variables  Dummy variables equal to 1 for the year of investment. 
     
Investment Characteristics    
Lead Investment  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the investor was the lead investor, 0 if not the lead investor, and 0.5 if unknown. 
Initial Amount Invested  The initial investment value (in real 2003 US dollars). 
     
 
 
 
 Table 2. Summary Statistics 
This table presents difference of means, medians and proportions tests for time until first investment, syndication, co-investment, board seats, and periodic cash flows for different characteristics of the funds, firms and investments.  The number of firms is not the same for each column because 
missing data for syndication, co-investment, board seats, lead investments, and country location are not used in the statistical tests in this table.  The number of observations for the holding periods reflects the time until full exit (observations that are not full exits are ignored in those tests).  
Observations are per entrepreneurial firm, not per investment round.  Variables are as defined in Table 1.  Cut-off values for the various tests are taken approximately around the mean of the particular variable in each test (and around 0 for the MSCI tests).  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
   Characteristic 
# Ent 
Firms 
Average 
Duration 
(Holding 
Period in 
Days) until 
First 
Investment 
Difference 
Test 
(means) 
Median 
Duration 
(Holding 
Period in 
Days) until 
First 
Investment 
Difference Test 
(medians) 
# Ent 
Firms 
Proportion of 
Syndicated 
Investments 
Differ-ence 
Test 
# Ent 
Firms 
Proportion of 
Co-
Investments 
Differ-
ence 
Test 
# Ent 
Firms 
Proportion of 
Investments 
with Board 
Seats 
Differ-
ence 
Test 
# Ent 
Firms 
Proportion of 
Investments 
with Periodic 
Cash Flows 
Difference 
Test 
                                                        
1  All Observations  3848  785.461     488     2219  0.434     3383  0.214     1402  0.730     3848  0.353    
                                                        
Legality Index > 20.5  2052  718.762 469  1303  0.413  1875  0.167  828 0.722  2052 0.335  2 
Legality Index < 20.5  1140  1042.399 
-8.479*** 
660 
p <= 1.21e-08*** 
848 0.432 
-0.848 
930  0.270 
-4.650*** 
378 0.728 
-0.240 
1140 0.429 
-5.072*** 
                                                        
Country MSCI Return at Investment 
> 0  2218  813.777  523  1504 0.394  1986  0.184  829 0.680  2218 0.437  3  Country MSCI Return at Investment 
< 0  988  883.300 
-1.718* 
520 
p <= 0.932  
658 0.482 
-3.772*** 
833  0.248 
-3.112*** 
384 0.815 
-5.716*** 
988 0.214 
11.759*** 
                                                        
Committed Capital > 
$117,443,000,000  1759  761.760  385  1093 0.495  1533  0.275  756 0.766  1759 0.225  4  Committed Capital < 
$117,443,000,000  2089  805.418 
-1.411 
611 
p <= 7.85e-18*** 
1126 0.374 
5.704*** 
1850  0.163 
5.288*** 
646 0.689 
3.628*** 
2089 0.462 
-14.777*** 
                                                        
Fund Number in VC Firm > 3  1378  470.104 365  995  0.339  1362  0.271  475 0.783  1378 0.227  5 
Fund Number in VC Firm <= 3  2470  961.397 
-20.012*** 
608 
p <= 1.9e-19*** 
1224 0.511 
-8.062*** 
2021  0.176 
4.468*** 
927 0.703 
3.740*** 
2470 0.424 
-11.752*** 
                                                        
Fund Date (Time Trend) > 8148 
days  2110  438.381 364  1293  0.474  1899  0.252  893 0.748  2110 0.227  6  Fund Date (Time Trend) < 8148 
days  1738  1206.830 
-25.578*** 
851 
p <= 3.59e-60*** 
926  0.377 
4.516*** 
1484  0.165 
4.052*** 
509 0.699 
2.259** 
1738 0.507 
-17.535*** 
                                 
Fund Age > 814 days  1227  ---  ---  680  0.401 995  0.236  382  0.683  1227  0.460 
7 
Fund Age < 814 days  2621  --- 
--- 
---  --- 
--- 
---  1539 0.448 
-2.008** 
2388 0.205 
1.364 
1020 0.748 
-2.814*** 
2621 0.304 
9.025*** 
                                                        
Fund Capital / GP > $70.3 million  861 502.931  348  613  0.237  833  0.192  62  0.726  861  0.247 
8 
Fund Capital / GP < $70.3 million  1731 545.783 
-1.826* 
425 
p <= 0.0244** 
1090 0.409 
-6.856*** 
1597 0.209 
-0.676 
824 0.692 
1.349 
1731 0.308 
-2.903*** 
                                                        
Seed Stage  223  412.390 337  143  0.846  213  0.136  191 0.743  223 0.166  9 
Other Stages  3625  808.411 
-13.380*** 
513 
p <= 8.97e-08*** 
2076 0.405 
10.282*** 
3170  0.219 
-1.925* 
1211 0.728 
0.350 
3625 0.365 
-5.828***   32 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics (Continued) 
   Characteristic 
# Ent 
Firms 
Average 
Duration 
(Holding 
Period in 
Days) until 
First 
Investment 
Difference 
Test 
(means) 
Median 
Duration 
(Holding 
Period in 
Days) until 
First 
Investment 
Difference Test 
(medians) 
# Ent 
Firms 
Proportion of 
Syndicated 
Investments 
Differ-
ence 
Test 
# Ent 
Firms 
Proportion of 
Co-
Investments 
Differ-
ence 
Test 
# Ent 
Firms 
Proportion of 
Investments 
with Board 
Seats 
Differ-
ence 
Test 
# Ent 
Firms 
Proportion of 
Investments 
with Periodic 
Cash Flows 
Difference 
Test 
Start-up Stage  90  565.544 396  17  1.000  72  0.236  35 0.743  90 0.100  10 
Other Stages  3758  790.728 
-3.693*** 
489 
p <= 0.55 
2202 0.429 
4.750*** 
3311  0.214 
0.185 
1367 0.730 
0.105 
3758 0.359 
-5.134*** 
                                                        
Early Stage  1093  708.634  428  876 0.462  1071  0.232  552 0.734  1093 0.177  11 
Other Stages  2755  815.941 
-3.365*** 
518 
p <= 0.0014*** 
1343 0.415 
2.191** 
2312  0.206 
1.182 
850 0.728 
0.251 
2755 0.423 
-13.945*** 
                                                        
Expansion Stage  467  814.555  526  321 0.243  384  0.227  173 0.607  467 0.463  12 
Other Stages  3381  781.442 
0.703 
488 
p <= 0.592  
1898 0.466 
-7.419*** 
2999  0.212 
0.469 
1229 0.748 
-4.667*** 
3381 0.338 
5.032*** 
                                                        
Market/Book > 7.5  1171  660.216 409  861  0.540  1102  0.238  677 0.771  1171 0.206  13 
Market/Book < 7.5  2677  840.247 
-6.012*** 
547 
p <= 1.51e-07*** 
1358 0.366 
7.998*** 
2281  0.203 
1.616 
725 0.692 
3.610*** 
2677 0.418 
-12.195*** 
                                                        
Lead Investor  981  1016.984 474  657  0.549  892  0.165  619 0.895  981 0.415  14 
Non-Lead Investor  557  734.496 
5.199*** 
417 
p <= 0.168 
395 0.706 
-4.928*** 
513  0.158 
0.217 
397 0.426 
14.861*** 
557 0.250 
6.245*** 
                                                        
Amount Invested > $4,840,594  913  1155.249 668  498  0.261  740  0.195  95 0.874  913 0.559  15 
Amount Invested < $4,840,594  2935  670.430 
10.640*** 
450 
p <= 1.11e-12*** 
1721 0.483 
-8.776*** 
2643  0.219 
-0.977 
1307 0.720 
6.042*** 
2935 0.290 
14.269*** 
                                                        
US Entrepreneur  1874  707.226 468  1197  0.410  1724  0.163  766 0.719  1874 0.323  16 
All Other Countries  1974  859.733 
-5.081*** 
524 
p <= 0.040** 
1022 0.461 
-2.379*** 
1659  0.267 
-4.894*** 
636 0.744 
-1.145 
1974 0.382 
-3.634*** 
                                                        
UK Entrepreneur  316  1075.326 589  194  0.304  220  0.223  29 0.690  316 0.579  17 
All Other Countries  3532  759.527 
5.062*** 
487 
p <= 0.070* 
2025 0.446 
-3.776*** 
3163  0.213 
0.248 
1373 0.731 
-1.107 
3532 0.333 
8.397*** 
                                                        
German Entrepreneur  194  796.201 494  149  0.309  177  0.198  57 0.737  194 0.325  18 
All Other Countries  3654  784.891 
0.175 
488 
p <= 0.865  
2070 0.443 
-3.156*** 
3206  0.215 
-0.405 
1345 0.730 
0.159 
3654 0.355 
-0.820 
                                                        
French Entrepreneur  395  1314.580 823  307  0.752  312  0.154  249 0.755  395 0.494  19 
All Other Countries  3453  724.933 
8.992*** 
470 
p <= 7.4e-08*** 
1912 0.382 
12.108*** 
3071  0.220 
-2.157** 
1153 0.725 
0.974 
3453 0.337 
5.888*** 
                                                          33 
 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
This table presents correlation coefficients across selected variables.  Coefficients greater than 0.03 in absolute value are statistically significant at the 5% level.  Variables are as defined in Table 1. 
        1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21  22 
1  Fund Age at time of First Investment  1.00                                                                
2  Syndication  -0.13  1.00                                                             
3  Co-Investment  -0.02  -0.01  1.00                                                          
4  Board Seats  -0.09  0.10  0.08  1.00                                                       
5  Periodic Cash Flows  0.03  -0.05  0.02  -0.03  1.00                                                    
6  Log (MSCI at investment date)  -0.01  0.03  -0.12  -0.04  0.17  1.00                                                 
7  Log (Committed Capital at 
Investment Date)  -0.12  0.22  0.16  0.07  -0.25  -0.24  1.00                                              
8  Log (Legality)  -0.03  0.16  -0.22  0.05  0.05  0.17  -0.15  1.00                                           
9  Log (Fund Number)  -0.20  -0.20  0.07  0.00  -0.13  -0.12  0.40  -0.24  1.00                                        
10  (Fund Date Time Trend)
-1/2  0.03  -0.09  -0.05  -0.02  0.05  0.00  -0.48  0.03  -0.14  1.00                                     
11  Log (Portfolio Size / Manager)  -0.02  -0.23  0.05  -0.06  -0.07  -0.28  0.34  -0.11  0.37  -0.11  1.00                                  
12  Seed  -0.08  0.26  -0.07  0.13  -0.08  -0.02  0.13  0.01  -0.02  -0.03  -0.31  1.00                               
13  startup  0.02  0.10  0.02  -0.03  -0.07  0.05  0.00  0.05  -0.16  -0.02  -0.15  -0.06  1.00                            
14  Early  -0.10  -0.11  0.01  -0.03  -0.20  -0.05  0.10  -0.18  0.40  0.01  0.20  -0.23  -0.14  1.00                         
15  Expansion  0.01  -0.19  0.04  -0.04  0.12  0.03  -0.10  0.00  0.05  0.12  0.10  -0.13  -0.08  -0.30  1.00                      
16  Log (Industry Market / Book)  -0.12  0.25  -0.03  0.12  -0.23  0.03  0.17  0.13  0.03  -0.03  -0.16  0.10  0.10  0.08  -0.08  1.00                   
17  Lead  Investor  0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.38 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.01  -0.01  0.04  0.03  -0.01  -0.04  -0.04  0.08  1.00                
18  Log  (Initial  Investment)  0.05 -0.15 0.05 -0.04 0.15 -0.17 0.17 -0.05 0.16 -0.01 0.49 -0.24 -0.14 -0.08 0.16 -0.20 -0.03 1.00             
19  USA  Entrepreneur  -0.06 0.13 -0.14 0.04 -0.08 0.12 -0.18 0.43 -0.27 0.07 -0.06 -0.10 0.10 -0.09 0.02 0.17 0.00 -0.05 1.00            
20  UK  Entrepreneur  0.02 -0.10 0.01 -0.06 0.09 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.19 -0.03 0.18 -0.05 -0.06 0.05 0.04 -0.10 0.01 0.15 -0.40 1.00        
21  France  Entrepreneur  0.00 0.17 -0.04 0.04 0.13 0.02 0.02 -0.11  -0.05 -0.03 -0.21 0.36 -0.06 -0.14 -0.10 -0.11 -0.04 -0.07 -0.39 -0.09 1.00     
22  Germany  Entrepreneur  0.02 -0.08 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.08 -0.35 -0.08 -0.08 1.00 
 
 Table 4.  Analysis of Time to Early Stage Investment and Deal Origination 
This table presents Cox proportional hazard model estimates of the determinants of screening duration: date of investment - date of fundraising.  The full sample of all exited and unexited (or 
partially exited) investments comprises 3213 observations from 39 countries.  Observations skipped where incomplete data for the transaction.  One observation is per entrepreneurial firm, not 
per staged investment round.  Time to investment in seed, start-up and early stage firms is presented in Models (1) - (5).  Time to deal origination is presented in Models (6) - (10).  Models (1) - 
(5) and (6) - (10) differ in the inclusion/exclusion of different right-hand-size variables to illustrate robustness.  The marginal effects (only) are presented.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively.  Variables are as defined in Table 1. 
  
Dependent Variable: Time to Deal Origination for all Seed, Start-up, 
Early, and Expansion Firms 
Dependent Variable: Time to Deal Origination for Seed, Start-up and 
Early Firms Only 
   Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6)  Model (7)  Model (8)  Model (9)  Model (10) 
                                
Market and Legal Factors                               
Log (1+ MSCI Return at Inv Date)  0.423***  0.421***  0.439*  0.439*  0.488**  0.430**  0.336  0.394  0.467  0.774*** 
Log (Commited Capital Overall Market 
at Inv Date)  0.201***  0.218***  0.011  0.011  -0.227***  0.323***  0.329***  0.061  0.007  -0.276*** 
Log  (Legality  Index)  2.998*** 2.933*** 3.035*** 3.007*** 2.507***  1.565*  1.449*  1.492*  2.645**  2.624** 
                               
VC Fund Characteristics                               
Log (Fund Number in the VC Firm)  0.110*  0.060  0.068  0.077  0.254***  -0.268***  -0.265***  -0.277***  -0.365***  0.210*** 
(Fund Date Time Trend)
-1/2  1.413***  1.442***  0.526 0.537 -0.759  1.567**  1.555**  0.488 0.394 -0.356 
log (Fund Capital / General Partner)  0.003  0.018  0.0133  0.0232  ---  0.172***  0.145***  0.144***  0.224***  --- 
                                
Entrepreneurial Firm Characteristics                               
Seed  Stage  0.677*** 0.662*** 0.725*** 0.734*** 0.934*** 0.801*** 0.853*** 0.912*** 0.908*** 1.139*** 
Start-up Stage  0.277  0.289*  0.292*  0.298*  0.464***  0.156 0.272 0.254 0.359*  0.847*** 
Early Stage  -0.118  -0.143  -0.134 -0.135 -0.091  --- --- --- --- --- 
Expansion Stage  -0.099  -0.129  -0.126  -0.128  0.036  --- --- --- --- --- 
Log  (Industry  Market  /  Book)  0.340*** 0.543*** 0.574*** 0.569*** 0.494*** 0.468*** 0.423*** 0.501*** 0.452***  0.151 
Industry  Dummy  Variables?  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country  Dummy  Variables?  No No No  Yes  Yes  No No No  Yes  Yes 
Investment Year Dummies?  No  No Yes  Yes  Yes No  No Yes  Yes  Yes 
                                
Investment Characteristics                               
Log  (Amount  Invested)  -0.101*** -0.100*** -0.090*** -0.089*** -0.101*** -0.094*** -0.095*** -0.083** -0.072** -0.089*** 
                                
Model Diagnostics                               
Total  Number  of  Observations  2284 2284 2284 2284 3176 1091 1091 1091 1091 1311 
Total  Number  of  'Exiting'  Observations  742 742 742 742  1121  384 384 384 384 500 
Loglikelihood  Function  -5044.034  -5034.36 -5027.02 -5025.39  -7733.8  -2309.29 -2303.33 -2298.21  -2286.9  -2977.45 
Chi-squared  statistic  219.583*** 238.937*** 253.617*** 256.880*** 403.271*** 168.228*** 180.151*** 190.397*** 213.005*** 208.963*** 
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Table 5.  Analysis of Syndication and Co-Investment 
This table presents logit regression model estimates of the determinants of syndication (Models (1) - (3)) and co-investment (Models (4) - (6)).  The full sample of all exited and unexited (or 
partially exited) investments comprises 3213 observations from 39 countries.  Observations skipped where incomplete data for the transaction.  One observation is per entrepreneurial firm, 
not per staged investment round.  Multinomial logits used to account for cases in which syndication or coninvestment was unknown.  The fund capital explanatory variable is excluded due 
to collinearity with the unknown syndication and coinvestment outcomes as there were similar unknown observations for that explanatory variable.  The marginal effects (only) are 
presented.  '---' means variable excluded for reasons of collinearity or a robustness check.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  Variables are as defined in 
Table 1. 
  
Dependent variable: syndication (different VC funds, different VC firms, 
investing in the same entrepreneurial firm) 
Dependent variable: co-investment (different VC funds, same VC firm, investing 
in the same entrepreneurial firm) 
   Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6) 
  
Marginal 
Effect 
Probabilit
y 
Syndicati
on=0 
Marginal 
Effect 
Probabilit
y 
Syndicati
on=1 
Marginal 
Effect 
Probabilit
y 
Syndicati
on=0 
Marginal 
Effect 
Probabilit
y 
Syndicati
on=1 
Marginal 
Effect 
Probabilit
y 
Syndicati
on=0 
Marginal 
Effect 
Probabilit
y 
Syndicati
on=1 
Marginal 
Effect 
Probabilit
y Co-
Investme
nt=0 
Marginal 
Effect 
Probabilit
y Co-
Investme
nt=1 
Marginal 
Effect 
Probabilit
y Co 
investme
nt=0 
Marginal 
Effect 
Probabilit
y Co 
investme
nt=1 
Marginal 
Effect 
Probabilit
y Co-
Investme
nt=0 
Marginal 
Effect 
Probabilit
y Co-
Investme
nt=1 
                                      
Constant  4.565*** -0.553 6.002***  -3.581*** 0.098  -0.057 -1.482***  1.281*** -0.581* 0.653**  -0.705** 0.709** 
                                      
Market and Legal 
Factors                                     
Log (1+ MSCI 
Return  at  Inv  Date)  -0.010 0.049  0.243***  -0.056 0.005 -0.001 0.036 -0.005 0.043 -0.014 0.024 -0.020 
Log (Commited 
Capital Overall 
Market  at  Inv  Date) -0.161*** 0.095*** -0.278*** 0.162***  -0.002  0.002  -0.050*** 0.039*** -0.038***  0.030**  -0.026*  0.025* 
Log (Legality 
Index)  -1.093***  -0.103  -1.197*** 0.609**  -0.077**  0.033*  0.771*** -0.661*** 0.391*** -0.384*** 0.386*** -0.386*** 
                                     
VC Fund 
Characteristics                                     
Log (Fund Number 
in the VC Firm)  0.314***  -0.140***  0.324***  -0.114***  0.026** -0.010** 0.024** 0.025**  0.014  0.013  -0.004  0.009 
Log (Fund Age at 
First Investment 
since  Fundraising)  0.019*** -0.014*** 0.029*** -0.020*** -0.0002  -0.0001  0.004 -0.005 0.005 -0.005 0.005 -0.005 
(Fund Date Time 
Trend)
-1/2  --- --- --- ---  11.338***  -4.788**  ---  ---   ---  ---   0.870  -0.417 
                                      
Entrepreneurial 
Firm 
Characteristics                                     
Seed  Stage  -0.301*** 0.276*** -0.224*** 0.189***  -0.013*  0.008*  --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Start-up  Stage  --- --- --- --- --- ---  -0.054 0.069 -0.055 0.059 -0.058 0.059 
Early  Stage  0.017 0.157*** -0.031 0.138*** -0.003  0.004*  0.036*  0.022  0.015  0.013  -0.006  0.010 
Expansion  Stage  0.114***  -0.056*  0.115***  -0.066**  0.006* -0.003  -0.044*  0.039* -0.033 0.024 -0.029 0.027 
Log (Industry 
Market  /  Book)  -0.112*** 0.077*** -0.207*** 0.130*** -0.012**  0.006*  -0.007  0.018  -0.034*  0.038**  -0.037**  0.038** 
Industry Dummy 
Variables?  No  No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes No  No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Dummy 
Variables?  No  No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes No  No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Investment Year 
Dummies?  No  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes No  No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                                      
Investment 
Characteristics                                     
Log (Amount 
Invested)  0.024***  -0.015**  0.026***  -0.006 0.001* -0.0004 -0.004 0.0019 -0.001 0.0001 -0.001 0.0004 
                                      
Model Diagnostics                                     
Total Number of 
Observations  3176 3176 3176 3176 3176 3176 
Number 
Syndication (Co-
Investment)  900 900 900 565 565 565 
Number No 
Syndication (No 
Co-Investment)  1245 1245 1245 2227 2227 2227 
Loglikelihood 
Function  -2916.469 -2749.458 -2683.604 -2058.143 -1919.353 -1913.789 
Chi-squared 
statistic  1088.626*** 1422.649*** 1554.356*** 1038.321*** 1315.902*** 1327.030***   36
 
Table 6.  Analysis of Board Seats and Periodic Cash Flows 
This table presents logit regression model estimates of the determinants of board seats (Models (1)-(5)) and periodic cash flows (Models (6)-(10)).  The full sample of all exited and 
unexited (or partially exited) investments comprises 3213 observations from 39 countries.  Observations skipped where incomplete data for the transaction.  '---' means variable 
excluded for reasons of collinearity or a robustness check. The fund capital explanatory variable is excluded in the board seat regressions due to collinearity with the unknown board 
seat outcomes as there were similar unknown observations for that explanatory variable.  One observation is per entrepreneurial firm, not per staged investment round.  Multinomial 
logits used for models (1) - (5) to account for cases in which the use of board seats was unknown.  Binomial logits used for models (6) - (10).  The marginal effects (only) are 
presented.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  Variables are as defined in Table 1. 
   Dependent Variable: Board Seats  Dependent Variable: Security with Periodic Cash Flows and Upside 
   Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  Model (4)  Model (5)  Model (6)  Model (7)  Model (8)  Model (9)  Model (10) 
  
Marginal 
Effect Prob 
Board 
Seats=1 
Marginal 
Effect Prob 
Board 
Seats=1 
Marginal 
Effect Prob 
Board 
Seats=1 
Marginal 
Effect Prob 
Board 
Seats=1 
Marginal 
Effect Prob 
Board 
Seats=1 
Marginal 
Effect 
Prob 
Periodic 
Cash 
Flows=1 
Marginal 
Effect 
Prob 
Periodic 
Cash 
Flows=1 
Marginal 
Effect 
Prob 
Periodic 
Cash 
Flows=1 
Marginal 
Effect 
Prob 
Periodic 
Cash 
Flows=1 
Marginal 
Effect 
Prob 
Periodic 
Cash 
Flows=1 
                                
Constant  -2.449*** -2.758*** -3.061*** -3.664***  -0.428 1.202  0.762*  0.467  -0.859  -0.740 
                                
Market and Legal Factors                               
Log (1+ MSCI Return at 
Inv  Date)  0.006 0.014 -0.054 -0.050 0.006  0.340***  0.344***  0.322***  0.356***  0.258*** 
Log (Commited Capital 
Overall Market at Inv 
Date)  0.075*** 0.072*** 0.120*** 0.115***  0.007  -0.079*** -0.065*** -0.024** -0.036*** -0.046*** 
Log  (Legality  Index)  0.704*** 0.736*** 0.700*** 0.884***  0.179* -0.394***  -0.161  -0.190  0.281  0.268 
                               
VC Fund Characteristics                               
Log (Fund Number in the 
VC  Firm)  -0.115*** -0.124*** -0.129*** -0.100***  -0.026**  -0.094*** -0.081*** -0.082*** -0.074***  0.004 
Log (Fund Age at First 
Investment since 
Fundraising)  -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.018*** -0.017***  -0.002  0.005  0.003  -0.0003  -0.003 -0.016*** 
(Fund Date Time Trend)
-
1/2  --- --- --- ---  -12.049***    ---  ---  ---  ---  -0.208* 
log (Fund Capital / 
General  Partner)  --- --- --- ---  ---  --- --- --- ---  -0.041*** 
                               
Entrepreneurial Firm 
Characteristics                               
Seed  Stage  0.384*** 0.395*** 0.384*** 0.313*** 0.066**  -0.170*** -0.140*** -0.143*** -0.228*** -0.220*** 
Start-up  Stage  -0.254*** -0.266*** -0.278*** -0.253*** -0.057** -0.404***  -0.363***  -0.361*** -0.310*** -0.189*** 
Early  Stage  0.179*** 0.196*** 0.202*** 0.186*** 0.042**  -0.219*** -0.181*** -0.171*** -0.190*** -0.124*** 
Expansion  Stage  0.091*** 0.091*** 0.087*** 0.090*** 0.022**  0.011  0.025  0.028  0.038  0.035 
Log (Industry Market / 
Book)  0.116*** 0.236*** 0.232*** 0.213*** 0.043**  ---  -0.176*** -0.181*** -0.143*** -0.120*** 
Industry Dummy 
Variables?  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Dummy 
Variables?  No No No  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Investment Year 
Dummies? No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes No No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                                
Investment Characteristics                               
Lead  Investor  0.312*** 0.299*** 0.300*** 0.287*** 0.053** 0.125***  0.142***  0.139***  0.149*** 0.098 
Log  (Amount  Invested)  -0.064*** -0.058*** -0.060*** -0.056***  -0.012**  0.055*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.043***  0.051 
                                
Model Diagnostics                               
Total Number of 
Observations  3176 3176 3176 3176 3176  3176  3176  3176  3176  2284 
Number Board Seats 
(Convertibles)  868 868 868 868 868  1176  1176  1176  1176  655 
Number No Board Seats 
(No  Convertibles)  331 331 331 331 331  2000  2000  2000  2000  1629 
Loglikelihood  Function  -2075.505 -1990.817 -1961.195 -1920.427 -1906.782  -1724.103  -1679.359  -1667.957  -1611.709  -1094.692 
Chi-squared  statistic  1472.221*** 1641.597*** 1700.840*** 1782.377*** 1809.667*** 738.416*** 827.903*** 850.707*** 963.203*** 547.950*** 
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